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CASEY AND THE LITTLE LEAGUERS
Vicki J. Limas*
I. INTRODUCTION
The significant negative reaction to the outcome of PGA Tour, Inc. v.
Casey Martin' illustrates the very attitudes and perceptions toward
people with disabilities that Congress intended to combat through the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 19902 ("the ADA" or "the Act"). The
Court's decision that PGA must allow Mr. Martin to ride a cart during
the PGA Tour play evoked a "Chicken Little" response far exceeding the
import of the decision. Over half of the readers responding to an Internet
survey conducted by Golf Digest said they did not agree with the Court's
decision. 4 The Washington Times columnist Suzanne Fields bemoaned a
decline in "'the morality of golf;"5 Sally Jenkins, in The Washington Post,
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean, The University of Tulsa College of Law. This
paper was prepared for the Symposium, Practitioners' Guide to the 2000-2001 Supreme
Court Term, at The University of Tulsa on November 30, 2001. Many thanks to David R.
Cordell of Connor & Winters, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for joining me in the oral presentation.
(Which is say, analyses, opinions, and conclusions herein are entirely my doing; David
cannot be blamed for any of them.)
1. 121 S. Ct. 1879 (2001).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994).
3. See generally W. Kent Davis, Why is the PGA Teed Off at Casey Martin? An Example
of How the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Has Changed Sports Law, 9 Marq. Sports
L.J. 1, 27-31 (1998); Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994, 996 (9th Cir. 2000). The Ninth
Circuit identified the defendant PGA Tour, Inc. as follows:
PGA is a non-profit association of professional golfers. It sponsors three
competitive tours: (1) the PGA Tour, its most competitive tour, (2) the
Nike Tour, one step down from the PGA Tour, and (3) the Senior PGA
Tour, restricted to professional golfers age 50 and over....
Id. at 996.
This article will refer to the entity PGA Tour, Inc. as "PGA." "PGA Tour" will refer to
the tournament.
4. From the Gallery, Golf Digest 19 (Sept. 1, 2001) (discussing a question posed in a
survey conducted by GofDgestcom). In response to the question, "Do you agree with the
U.S. Supreme Court decision on Casey Martin?" 52.4% of respondents said no and 47.6%
said yes. Id. at 19.
5. Suzanne Fields, Advantages for the Disadvantaged; Supreme Court Lowers
Standards, Wash. Times A17 (June 4, 2001) (quoting Ben Hogan's comment, "Overall, the
moral standards of society have declined in recent years.... [blut the morality of golf
hasn't changed."). Fields does not indicate the context of Hogan's comment but said it was
made "before the Supreme Court justices putted." Id. at A17.
1
Limas: Casey and the Little Leaguers
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2001
TULSA LAW REVIEW
accused the Court of creating a new "constitutional right." 6  Jenkins
predicted that "golf, and a number of other sports, stand to be
fundamentally altered thanks to this decision. "7 Fields fiercely defended
golfs "traditions," which, she boasted, "haven't changed that much,"8 as
opposed to, she said, baseball's change in uniform colors and the
American League pinch hitter rule, basketball's three-point shots, tennis'
tie-breaker scoring, and football's use of separate defensive and offensive
teams. 9 It is unclear whether Fields would consider the foregoing rule
changes "fundamental alterations" to the respective games, but she
apparently found use of a cart in the PGA Tour an affront to golfs
"traditions," whatever they are.10  (Fortunately for the game, golf-and
the PGA in particular-has forsaken one of its traditions: a whites-only
rule. 11)
Despite Justice Scalia's characterization of sports as "amusement,"
as opposed to "productive activity, " 12 Americans take their sports-
professional and amateur-very seriously. 13 Critics of the decision,
including Scalia, protest that the government, through the courts, has
no business in American sporting events. 
14
Of the nine Supreme Court cases interpreting the ADA, this 7-2
decision in Martin's favor is one of only three that have not sharply
6. Sally Jenkins, A Good Walk is Truly Spoiled, Wash. Post D01 (May 30,2001).
7. Fields, supran. 5, atA17.
8. IL
9. See L
10. See id. To be fair, many sports commentators applauded the decision. E.g. Dave
Anderson, Sports of the Times; The Cart Doesn't Hit the Ball, N.Y. Times D1 (May 30, 2001);
Rich Brooks, Objections to Disabled Golfer Just Aren't Up to Par, Sarasota Herald-Tribune
BV1 (June 2, 2001); S. Scott Rohrer, Martin Case is Victory for Human Decency, Special to
The Washington Post, Deseret News (Salt Lake City, Utah) AA08 (June 10, 2001); Bill
Wallace, Overreacting to Casey Martin's Golf Cart, Bridge News (June 12, 2001) (available in
LEXIS, News library, ALLNWS file).
11. See e.g. Stanley Mosk, My Shot; The Tour's Fear of Carts is the Same Form of Bigotry
that Caused the Caucasian-only Clause, Sports Illustrated G46 (June 11, 2001). Mosk, a
California State Supreme Court Justice, wrote:
I was thrilled by the Supreme Court's decision.., but disheartened by the
reaction of Tour officials and players who fear that the Tour could be overrun by
carts. The innate bigotry fueling their fears is the same bigotry that lay behind
the Caucasian-only clause barring blacks from Tour events until 1961, when a
fight that I had initiated forced the PGA of America to drop that offensive and
illegal provision.
Id. at G46. See generally Davis, supra n. 3, at 29, for the proposition that, until 1975, no
black players were invited to The Masters tournament.
12. PGA Tour, 121 S. Ct. at 1903 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
13. A disability law expert recently discussed how the media's treatment of sports and
entertainment figures has shaped the public's awareness of disability issues. She notes
the overall positive nature of the media's coverage and its effect on public attitudes, but
notes that reactions may not be so positive when issues involve "accommodation of the
condition, particularly when the requested accommodation is excusing behavior, conduct,
or performance." Laura F. Rothstein, Don't Roll in My Parade: The Impact of Sports and
Entertainment Cases on Public Awareness and Understanding of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 19 Rev. Litig. 399, 422 (2000).
14. See Davis, supran. 3, at 13-16.
[Vol. 37:81
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divided the Court.15 Moreover, in this case, the Court acknowledged the
ADA's "broad mandate"16 and the need to broadly interpret provisions
concerning the Act's coverage to achieve Congress' "expansive
purpose."17 As will be discussed, this "broad mandate" has not been
consistently followed in the Court's previous interpretations of the scope
of the ADA. The Court's inconsistency, as well as the severity of Martin's
disability, provoked criticism that the decision was motivated by
compassion rather than law;18 that, although Martin's condition is
unfortunate, he is still "cheating" by using a cart and therefore taking
advantage of the ADA.' 9 Fields stated, "[elven if Casey Martin were able
to win a championship, it would be with an asterisk," characterizing the
decision as "extended to designate special privileges for a professional
golfer with a disability."20 Justice Scalia in dissent opined that allowing
Martin to use a cart "gives him a 'lucky' break every time he plays.
"2
Martin's "lucky break," however, is not any advantage he would receive
from the ADA in actual tournament competition-the "lucky break" is
the fact that the ADA enables Martin to compete at all.
15. Only two of the Court's ADA decisions were unanimous. Cleveland v. Policy Mgt. Sys.
Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 798 (1999) (holding that receipt of Social Security Disability Insurance
benefits does not preclude suit under Title I of the ADA as long as the individual can
explain the inconsistency in her statements regarding her ability to work); Pa. Dep't of
Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 208 (1998) (holding that a state prison's refusal to
admit a disabled prisoner to its boot camp program violated Title II of the ADA).
The other six cases were widely split. In its first opportunity, the Court broadly
interpreted the ADA. Bragdon v. Abbott 524 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1998). However, on a
narrow 5-4 basis, the Court held that asymptomatic HIV infection is a disability under the
ADA. Id. at 641-42. In the next term, the balance shifted to a constrained reading of the
ADA. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), Murphy v. United Parcel Service,
527 U.S. 516 (1999), and Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999), all Title I
employment cases, held 5-4 that disability must be determined by considering the
impairment in its mitigated condition. For an analysis of the Court's reasoning in these
four cases defining "disability," see Vicki J. Limas, Of One-Legged Marathoners and Legally
Blind Pilots: Disabling the ADA on a Case-by-Case Basis, 35 Tulsa L.J. 505 (2000).
Concurrently with its decisions in the trilogy, a plurality of the Court held in
Olmstead v. L. C. by Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 607 (1999), that Title II required a state to
provide community-based treatment for mentally disabled individuals if resources were
available after taking the needs of other mentally disabled individuals into account.
Finally, in Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 373-74 (2001), decided this
term, the Court held 5-4 that the ADA did not abrogate states' sovereign immunity, and
therefore states could not be sued by individuals for damages.
16. PGA Tour, 121 S. Ct. at 1889.
17. Id. at 1892.
18. Id. at 1898.
19. Tim Rosaforte, Casey's Last Stand, Golf Digest 174 (May 1, 2001). Martin described
the following encounter, which occurred at the Kemper Insurance Open in 2000:
I was playing very well going into the final round. I was on the 12"' hole and the
whole green was lined with people. I missed about a 20-foot putt and the crowd
went, 'Ohhhl' Then some guy yells, 'Too bad, you cheater'
Id. at 174.
20. Fields, supra n. 5, at A17. Casting aspersions on Martin's integrity, she also wrote,
"Golf is a game about rules, personal honor, even self-imposed penalties which lend this
particular sport a rigorous and ethical elegance.... Golf is about integrity." Id.
21. PGA Tour, 121 S. Ct. at 1903.
20011
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The following will discuss Martin's ADA claim and the Court's
decision upholding his right to ride a cart in the PGA Tour because of his
disability. It will counter arguments and criticisms that the ADA will
change the nature of competitive sporting events. Even though the legal
impact of the decision is quite limited, its social and cultural impact can
be far-reaching.
II. CASEY MARTIN'S TITLE III CLAIM
Martin's claim presented three issues, the first of which was not
contested: 1) whether Martin is "an individual with a disability" within
the meaning of the ADA; 2) whether he falls within the protections of
Title III with regard to his desire to play in the PGA Tour; and, if so, 3)
whether allowing him to ride a cart in the tournament would
"fundamentally alter the nature of' the PGA Tour, as that term is used in
Title 111.22
Martin is undisputedly disabled within the meaning of the ADA.2
3
He has suffered since birth from Klippel-Trenaunay-Weber Syndrome, "a
degenerative circulatory disorder that obstructs the flow of blood from
his right leg back to his heart."24 The disease has atrophied Martin's
right leg. The act of walking causes him "pain, fatigue, and anxiety"
25
and "significant risk of hemorrhaging, developing blood clots, and
fracturing his tibia so badly that an amputation might be required."
26
Notwithstanding his disability, no one seems to doubt that Martin
has attained elite status as a golfer. By age fifteen, he had won
22. Id. at 1884.
23. The ADA defines "disability" as follows:
The term "disability" means, with respect to an individual-
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
24. PGA Tour, 121 S. Ct. at 1885.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1886. See e.g. Rick Reilly, On His Last Leg, Sports Illustrated 102 (June 4,
2001). A reporter described the appearance of Martin's leg:
He showed me his leg in his room one night. I asked to see it, actually. He stood
up, took off his pants and then the two nylon restraining stockings on his right
leg that are supposed to keep down the swelling. What was underneath looked
like a baseball bat somebody had used to hit a thousand rocks.
'Watch the blood drain into it,' he said. Over the next two minutes that bony stick
of a leg started turning purple and globby and marbled right in front of my eyes,
bloating to twice its diameter. Grotesque pools of blood gathered in his hip, knee,
ankle. He let me run my hand gingerly along his shin, which felt like a long, fat
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seventeen junior events in his home state of Oregon; as a high school
27senior, he won the state championship. His Stanford University golf
team won the 1994 National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA)
championship.2 In 1998 and 1999, he qualified for the Nike Tour; his
1999 performance qualified him for the 2000 PGA Tour.29 Of the twenty-
four events he entered in 1999, he "made the cut 13 times, and had 6
top-10 finishes, coming in second twice and third once."
30
Stanford University sought and received waivers for Martin from the
Pacific 10 Conference and NCAA rules requiring players to walk and
carry their clubs. 31  The United States Golf Association ("USGA)
voluntarily waived its no-cart rules for Martin in the U.S. Open and other
USGA tournaments. Although Nike Tour and PGA Tour rules do not
allow carts in the actual tournament, those rules do allow use of carts in
tournament qualifying rounds, which Martin completed successfully.
33
In order to play the PGA Tour, Martin requested a waiver of the
tournament walking rule, supported by medical documentation, but PGA
summarily denied his request. Martin had attained his status as a
professional golfer using a cart, a fact that held no significance
whatsoever until his attempt to play in the PGA Tour.
The Court focused on the remaining two issues of Martin's ADA
case: whether he is entitled to the protection of Title III with regard to his
desire to play in the PGA Tour; and, if so, whether use of a cart "would
fundamentally alter the nature of' the PGA Tour.35 Martin had prevailed
on both issues in the district court and the Ninth Circuit.3 6 However,
another disabled golfer had lost in the Seventh Circuit in Olinger v.
United States GolfAssociationr7
27. PGA Tour, 121 S. Ct. at 1885.
28. Id.
29. Id. The district court explained the relationship among the various tours staged by
PGA Tou.
The PGA Tour stages the PGA Tour, senior PGA Tour, the Nike Tour, and the
Qualifying School Tournament. The Senior Tour is for PGA Tour golfers of 50+
years in age. The Qualifying School Tournament screens those who are
competing for entry into the PGA Tour and Nike Tour. The PGA Tour admits the
most skilled golfers; the Nike Tour admits those at the next highest level....
Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1248 n. 9 (D. Ore. 1998).
30. PGA Tour, 121 S. Ct. at 1885.
31. Id. at 1886.
32. See id. However, like PGA, USGA resisted a similar request in Olinger v. United
States Golf Ass'n, 205 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2000); USGA prevailed in the Seventh Circuit.
See text accompanying infra nn. 38-42.
33. PGA Tour, 121 S. Ct. at 1885. PGA Tour waived its walking rule in the third
qualifying round of the Qualifying School Tournament ("Q-School") for all competitors. Id.
at 1896 n. 49. See discussion infra Parts Ill & IV for a description of Nike and PGA Tour
rules concerning use of carts and an explanation of "Q-School."
34. PGA Tour, 121 S. Ct. at 1886.
35. Id. at 1893.
36. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 204 F.3d 994 (9thCir. 2000).
37. 205 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2000).
20011
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Like Martin, Olinger was unquestionably disabled; a degenerative
condition substantially limited his ability to walk." The Seventh Circuit
did not rule on the question of whether Title III covered the USGA. 39 It
assumed coverage but ruled that USGA was not required to allow Olinger
to use a golf cart in United States Open tournament qualifying rounds.4"
Use of a cart, the court held, would alter the fundamental nature of the
tournament competition by altering the factors of "physical endurance
and stamina" and uniformity of rules, which it found to be "integral parts
of championship-level golf."4' Further, the court held, evaluation of
requests to waive the walking rule would create an "unnecessary"
42
administrative burden on USGA. With these two decisions as
background, the Supreme Court took certiorari on the issues of coverage
and liability.
III. TITLE III'S COVERAGE OF PGA AND CASEY MARTIN
Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination against individuals with
disabilities in the area of public accommodations. In the Court's words,
Title III is part of the ADA's "sweeping purpose" to eliminate
discrimination in "major areas of public life." 43 The ADA defines "public
accommodations" by way of example, enumerating twelve categories of
private entities as public accommodations, one of which expressly
includes golf courses. 44
38. Id. at 1001.
39. Id. at 1005. USGA argued that as an organization, it did fall within one of twelve
specific categories of private entities that qualify as a public accommodation under Title III.
40. See iU.
41. Id. at 1006.
42. Id. at 1007.
43. PGA Tour, 121 S. Ct. at 1889. Discrimination in employment is covered by Title I, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (1994); discrimination in public services offered by state and local
entities is covered by Title I, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (1994). Title III appears at 42
U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (1994).
44. Id. § 12181(7). These categories are as follows:
The following private entities are considered public accommodations for purposes
of this subchapter, if the operations of such entities affect commerce-
(A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging, except for an establishment
located within a building that contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire
and that is actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as the
residence of such proprietor;
(B) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink;
(C) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of
exhibition or entertainment;
(D) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of public
gathering;
(E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping center, or
other sales or rental establishment;
(F) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel service,
shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer,
[Vol. 37:81
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PGA did not deny its status as a public accommodation. 45 However,
it argued that, although it leases golf courses for its tournaments, the
tournament itself places the golf course into the category of "place of
exhibition or entertainment."46 According to PGA, "it operates not a 'golf
course' during its tournaments but a 'place of exhibition or
entertainment;'" therefore players in its tournaments are hired
entertainers rather than "clients or customers" of it or the golf courses it
leases.47 Thus, PGA turned the question of whether it was a public
accommodation subject to Title III's prohibitions into the question of
whether Martin was an individual entitled to Title III's protections.
Title III's prohibitions are stated in a section titled "General rule:"
No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in
the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by
any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public
accommodation. 48
The statute contains additional language construing the "general rule."
Under a subsection heading "General prohibitions," the ADA prohibits
public accommodations from excluding "an individual or class of
individuals" from participation in the public accommodations' offerings
'on the basis of disability": a public accommodation may not, "directly,
or through contractual... or other arrangements" 49: (i) deny
pharmacy, insurance office, professional office of a health care provider, hospital,
or other service establishment;
(G) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public transportation;
(H) a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display or collection;
(I) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation;
(J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate private
school, or other place of education;
(K) a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food bank, adoption
agency, or other social service center establishment;
(L) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place of exercise
or recreation.
Id.
45. PGA had argued in the lower courts that it was not a public accommodation. At
trial, PGA argued that it was a "private club" exempt from coverage by § 12187 of Title III
or, altematively, that the area of play "behind the ropes" was not a public accommodation.
It maintained the second argument at the appellate level but did not raise either before the
Supreme Court. PGA Tour, 121 S. Ct. at 1890.
46. Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(C) (1994).
47. PGA Tour, 121 S. Ct. at 1891. Consequently, PGA concluded, the only portion of the
ADA arguably relevant to the players-as-entertainers would be Title I prohibiting
discrimination in employment. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq. (1994). The players would be
independent contractors and therefore not "employees" covered by Title I, according to
PGA. PGA Tour, 121 S. Ct. at 1891.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994).
49. Id. § 12182(b)(1)(A).
20011
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participation in its activities5 °; (ii) provide unequal opportunity to
participate in or benefit from its activitiesl; and (iii) provide separate
benefits if such benefits are not "as effective" as those it provides to
others.5 2 "Individual or class of individuals" as used in (i)-(iii) is defined
as "clients or customers of the covered public accommodation that
enters into the contractual. . . or other arrangement."
5 3
A second subsection titled "Specific prohibitions" follows. That
section, as its name implies, provides more specific examples of ways in
which a public accommodation would discriminate under the ADA.
These "specific prohibitions" generally have to do with the affirmative
duty to accommodate individuals with disabilities, the duty at issue in
PGA Tour. Following is the provision relevant to Martin's case:
For purposes of subsection (a) of this section, discrimination includes-
(ii) a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or
procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to
individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that
making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations; .... 54
This subsection does not contain the language "individual or class of
individuals" nor its definition, as did the "General prohibitions"
subsection.
These two subsections illustrate the dual nature of the ADA's
protections. Unlike other anti-discrimination statutes, the ADA provides
not only for "equal treatment," but also "equal opportunity." Other anti-
discrimination statutes mandate equal treatment of individuals in
protected classes as to all other individuals; one's status as an individual
in a protected class is deemed irrelevant to activities covered by the
various statutes, and those laws impose no duty upon covered entities
other than equal treatment.5 5  But one's disability may indeed be
50. Id. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i).
51. Id. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii).
52. Id. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii).
53. Id. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iv). The Court explained the relationship among clauses (i)
through (iv) of the "general prohibitions" subsection:
Clauses (i) through (iii) of the subparagraph prohibit public accommodations from
discriminating against a disabled 'individual or class of individuals' in certain
ways either directly or indirectly through contractual arrangements with other
entities. Those clauses make clear on the one hand that their prohibitions cannot
be avoided by means of contract, while clause (iv) makes clear on the other hand
that contractual relationships will not expand a public accommodation's
obligations under the subparagraph beyond its own clients or customers.
PGA Tour, 121 S. Ct. at 1891.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1994).
55. An exception is the duty of employers to accommodate the religious practices and
[Vol. 37:81
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relevant to that person's ability to participate in areas of life such as
education, employment, or activities and benefits offered by public
accommodations5 6 That is why the ADA does not, in all cases, mandate
equal treatment of disabled individuals as to non-disabled individuals.
Equal treatment is required only if the individual can enjoy the activity
at issue without any consideration at all of his or her disability.
Otherwise, the ADA requires or permits differential treatment. The
cornerstone of the ADA is "equal opportunity."
57
As the Court recognized in PGA Tour,8 the ADA's dual protection
arises from Congress' findings that people with disabilities face
discrimination in the forms of, inter alia, "outright intentional exclusion"
and "failure to make modifications to existing facilities and practices."5 9
Title III's "General rule" prohibiting discrimination addresses equal
treatment as well as equal opportunity.6 ° Its "Specific prohibitions"
beliefs of employees or prospective employees under § 7010) of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1994). That duty to accommodate is not onerous;
an employer need only show the proposed accommodation would entail more than "a de
minimis cost" Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977).
56. See e.g. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (1994). The congressional "Findings and Purposes"
prefacing the ADA:
The Congress finds that-
(3) discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical
areas as employment, housing, public accommodations, education,
transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health services,
voting, and access to public services....
Id.
57. See id. Congress' findings continue:
(8) the Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure
equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-
sufficiency for such individuals; and
(9) the continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and
prejudice denies people with disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal
basis and to pursue those opportunities for which our free society is justifiably
famous, and costs the United States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses
resulting from dependency and nonproductivity.
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (1994). See Michael J. Zimmer, Charles A. Sullivan, Richard F.
Richards, & Deborah A. Calloway, Cases and Materials on Employment Discrimination 740-
41 (5th ed., Aspen L. & Bus. 2000).
58. PGA Tour, 121 S. Ct. at 1889
59. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(5) (1994).
60. The "General prohibition" subsection includes the following relevant provisions:
(i) Denial of participation
It shall be discriminatory to subject an individual or class of individuals on the
basis of disability or disabilities of such individual or class .... to a denial of the
opportunity of the individual or class to participate in or benefit from the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity.
(ii) Participation in unequal benefits
It shall be discriminatory to afford an individual or class of individuals, on the
2001]
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subsection, setting out the duty to accommodate individuals with
disabilities, addresses the manner in which public accommodations
must afford equal opportunities to those individuals so that they may
"enjoy" that which is offered by the public accommodation.
As stated previously, PGA argued that it owed no duty to Martin
under Title III because, as a player in the PGA Tour, Martin is an
"entertainer," not a "client or customer" of PGA or the golf course it
leases. The latter, it argued, is the only class of disabled individuals
protected by Title III. Under PGA's interpretation of Title III, the "clients
or customers" definition of "individual or class of individual" contained in
the "General prohibitions" subsection governs the entire scope of Title III,
including the "Special prohibitions" subsection that governs its duty to
accommodate.
Although the "clients or customers" language of the "General
prohibitions" subsection does not appear in the "Special prohibitions"
subsection, the Court declined to address whether the language applies
61to the whole statute. Instead, it held that players in PGA tournaments
are "clients or customers" of PGA. This conclusion was based on the
public nature of PGA's qualifying tournaments: one way of entering a
Nike Tour or PGA Tour is through a "Q-School," which is "a three-stage
qualifying tournament."6 2  Q-School, operated by PGA, is open to any
member of the general public who can pay a $3,000 entry fee and obtain
recommendation letters from two Nike Tour or PGA Tour members.63
PGA Tour players are "clients or customers" of PGA, the Court reasoned,
because members of the general public may vie for the "privilege" (a term
used in the "General prohibitions" subsection) of playing in its
tournaments, just as members of the general public may enjoy the
.privilege" of attending the tournaments as spectators (who are
undisputably "clients or customers" of PGA).64 In other words, because
PGA's tournaments are open to the public, they are public
accommodations and entrants are "clients or customers."
Justice Scalia, in a dissent joined by Justice Thomas, insisted that
Martin did not fall within Title III's protection of "clients or customers" of
a public accommodation. Rather, Scalia asserted, Martin would be an
independent contractor with PGA because he earns his living playing golf
basis of a disability or disabilities of such individual or class, .... with the
opportunity to participate in or benefit from a good, service, facility, privilege,
advantage, or accommodation that is not equal to that afforded to other
individuals.
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A) (1994) (emphasis added).
61. PGA Tour, 121 S. Ct. at 1891.
62. Id. at 1884. See Davis, supra n. 3, at 31 for a thorough description of PGA
elimination tournaments and entry into the PGA Tour, the Nike Tour, and the Senior PGA
Tour.
63. See PGA Tour, 121 S. Ct. at 1884.
64. Id. at 1892.
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and is contractually entitled to a certain sum of money if he wins. Scalia
analogized Martin's situation to that of a professional baseball player:
The PGA Tour is a professional sporting event, staged for the
entertainment of a live and TV audience, the receipts from whom (the TV
audience's admission price is paid by advertisers) pay the expenses of the
tour, including the cash prizes for the winning golfers. The professional
golfers on the tour are no more 'enjoying' (the statutory term) the
entertainment that the tour provides, or the facilities of the golf courses on
which it is held, than professional baseball players 'enjoy' the baseball
games in which they play or the facilities of Yankee Stadium.
65
Scalia then analogized the Q-School to an audition for actors, tryouts for
professional sports teams, or, oddly, a bar examination6 6 :
But the Q-School is no more a 'privilege offered for the general public's
'enjoyment' than is the California Bar Exam. It is a competition for entry
into the PGA Tour-an open tryout, no different in principle from open
casting for a movie or stage production, or walk-on tryouts for other
professional sports, such as baseball.... But the purpose of holding
those tryouts is not to provide entertainment; it is to hire .... 67
Under Scalia's logic, once Martin made it through the PGA Tour
qualifying tournaments in Q-School, his relationship with PGA changed
because it then "hired" him as an independent contractor to play in the
PGA Tour. With respect to the nature of Martin's "remuneration" from
PGA, Scalia continued:
It makes not a bit of difference, insofar as their 'customer' status is
concerned, that the remuneration for their performance (unlike most of
the remuneration for ballplayers) is not fixed but contingent-viz., the
purses for the winners in the various events, and the compensation from
product endorsements that consistent winners are assured. The
compensation of many independent contractors is contingent upon their
success-real estate brokers, for example, or insurance salesmen.
6 8
Scalia's analogies fail by their own terms. Baseball players, as the
majority pointed out, are clearly employees of their clubs or teams.6 9
65. Id. at 1900.
66. Entities offering bar examinations, as well as other licensing or certifying
examinations or courses, are covered by a separate provision of Title III mandating that
they "offer such examinations or courses in a place and manner accessible to persons with
disabilities or offer altemative accessible arrangements for such individuals." 42 U.S.C. §
12189 (1994). Scalia asserted that § 12189 "would have been unnecessary" if "open
tryouts were 'privileges' under § 12182, and participants in the tryouts 'customers.'" PGA
Tour, 121 S. Ct. at 1901 n. 1 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The duty imposed on such entities,
however, is absolute; defenses are not available to show an accommodation is not feasible,
as under Title III's "General rule" against discrimination and the provisions implementing
iL 42 U.S.C. § 12189 (1994). (See infra n. 147 for a discussion of the ADA's defenses.)
Presumably, that is why Congress gave these entities their own section in Title III.
67. PGA Tour, 121 S. Ct. at 1900-01.
68. Id. at 1900.
69. Id. at 1892. See Stephen B. Goldberg, Frank E. A. Sander, & Nancy H. Rogers,
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They contract with a particular club (e.g., the New York Yankees to use
Scalia's example) for a particular salary to play a particular number of
games in a particular term. The club, in conjunction with its agreement
with the American or National League, determines where players will
play, when they will play, whom they will play, and whether they will
play. Once the players' base salaries are fixed by a contract for a certain
term, those salaries do not fluctuate depending on how well or poorly
they play during that term (players may receive a contractual bonus for
exemplary performance). And although the players agree to be bound by
League rules (as an attorney is bound by the rules of a bar), they are not
hired by the Leagues.
Nor is a PGA tournament player like an "actor" because he achieved
a tournament slot through "Q-School." The golfer does not "audition" for
a slot in the tournament; PGA does not select the tournament
competitors as a theater selects actors. Rather, the golfer competes in a
series of elimination tournaments to achieve a slot in the "elite"
tournament, which is yet another competition. Anyone who can pay the
entry fee and provide references may enter PGA's tournament
elimination process. Progression through the elimination process into
the elite tournaments does not change the entrants' relationship to PGA,
70the entity sponsoring the progressive tournaments.
Despite the fact that Martin may earn his living by playing golf, he
is like the professional gambler, pool player, or chess player, not the
professional ball player. He is no more an independent contractor of
PGA than gamblers, pool players, or chess players are independent
contractors of the venues where they gamble, shoot pool, or play chess.
All enter games to test skill and luck against others (or against "the
house," depending on the gambler's game). What makes them
"professionals" is their ability to win money through skill and luck and
live off those winnings. "Remuneration" is in the form of a prize or
winnings, not a salary or commission. (To quote fictional pool player
Dispute Resolution: Negotiation, Mediation, and Other Processes 273-74 (3d ed., Aspen L. &
Bus. 1999) (describing labor contracts and process to resolve salary disputes between
major league baseball players and major league teams, their "employers").
70. The Ninth Circuit posed the following analogy:
If a stadium owner invited the public to compete in long distance races, and
continued to run heats until only the ten best runners remained, the track would
be no less a place of public accommodation when the fimal race was run. We see
no justification in reason or in the statute to draw a line beyond which the
performance of athletes becomes so excellent that a competition restricted to their
level deprives its situs of the character of a public accommodation.
Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 204 F.3d 994, 999 (9th Cir. 2000). As stated above, PGA's
argument in the Ninth Circuit focused on its own status as a public accommodation. But,
the analogy fits the question PGA raised in the Supreme Court of the relationship between
it and the players in its tournaments. The winners of elimination tournaments are no less
members of the general public than when they started the elimination tournament process.
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"Fast" Eddie Felson, "Money won is twice as sweet as money earned."7 1 )
Like the others, Martin wins some and loses some.v2 If he does not place
among the "winners" in a professional golf tournament, he receives no
reward for his efforts in that tournament. If he is very good (or "elite," as
PGA puts it), he can make a living from his winnings. If he is very good,
he may also receive "remuneration" from contracts for product
endorsements, but such contracts are not with PGA. Scalia's analogy
could not avoid the very terms that defeat it: he characterized
professional golfers' "remuneration" in the above-quoted passages as
"prizes for the winning golfers" and "purses for the winners."
The fact that a tournament player contracts with PGA to play a
certain number of tournaments does not make him an independent
contractor, as Scalia asserts.73 Such an agreement is no different from a
casino or lottery sponsor contracting with winners to publish their
photographs for publicity designed to generate more participants and
hence more income. True, the elite golfers are the "bread and butter" of
professional golfing association tournaments; their presence draws the
crowds, the commercial sponsors, and the income those entities provide.
But the fact that PGA uses the players to draw the crowds -whether for
one tournament or a specific number-does not make the players
independent contractors who "sell" their golfing "services" to the golfing
association. They are still competitors, just as they were when they
entered Q-School.
The majority, the dissent, and even PGA agreed that PGA is a
"public accommodation" under Title III when it stages a tournament.
The majority found golfers in such tournaments to be "clients or
customers" of the entity staging the tournament under Title III's "general
prohibitions" subsection. Having decided the threshold issue of
coverage, the Court proceeded to determine whether use of a golf cart in
the PGA Tour would "fundamentally alter the nature of' the tournament.
IV. THE FUNDAMENTAL NATURE OF THE PGA TouR COMPETITION
As stated previously, Title III imposes an affirmative duty to
accommodate individuals' disabilities, as it defines "discrimination" to
include
71. The Color of Money (Touchstone Pictures 1986) (motion picture).
72. Anderson, supra n. 10, at D1. Last season, Martin seemed to be losing more than
winning:
Martin, who made the 36-hole cut in 14 of his 29 PGA Tour events last year for
$143,248 in prize money, has earned a career total of nearly $400,000 on both
Tours as well as substantial endorsement income. But this year on the Buy.com
Tour, he has survived only four of eight cuts in collecting $6,433; he missed the
cut in two PGA Tour events.
Id.
73. PGA Tour, 121 S. CL at 1901 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or
procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford such goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to
individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that
making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations.
74
A public accommodation must modify its "policies, practices or
procedures" in order to accommodate an individual with a disability
when: 1) the requested modification is reasonable; 2) the requested
modification is necessary for that individual; and 3) the requested
modification does not fundamentally alter the nature of what is offered
by the public accommodation. 5 There is no apparent priority among
these requirements; an answer to either of the "reasonable" or
"necessary" inquiries might obviate discussion of either of the others.76
The plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the requested modification
is reasonable and necessary.77 By the terms of the statute, however, the
"fundamental alteration" element is a defense that must be
"demonstrated" by the entity that is a public accommodation. 78 PGA
apparently conceded that its tournament walking rule is a "policy,
practice, or procedure." It further conceded that allowing use of a cart
would be a "reasonable modification" of the walking rule and that use of
a cart would be "necessary" to enable Martin to play in its tournament7 9
However, PGA argued, and bore the burden of proving, that use of a cart
"would fundamentally alter the nature of" its tournament.
PGA asserted that the walking rule is essential to the nature of its
tournaments because walking injects the element of fatigue, which could
adversely affect contestants' performance and hence the tournament's
80
outcome. In support of this argument at trial, PGA offered testimony of
golfing greats Arnold Palmer, Jack Nicklaus, and Ken Venturi.8 ' The
Court summarized their testimony as follows:
Arnold Palmer, Jack Nicklaus, and Ken Venturi explained that fatigue can
be a critical factor in a tournament, particularly on the last day when
74. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1994).
75. PGA Tour, 121 S. Ct. at 1893 n. 38.
76. See id. It might be that the "reasonable" requirement and the "not fundamentally
alter" requirement would involve the same considerations. This frequently occurs in cases
under Title I, which requires the plaintiff to show that a proposed workplace
accommodation is "reasonable," but requires the defendant to show that the proposed
accommodation would work an "undue hardship."
77. See Johnson v. Gambrinus Co./Spoetzel Brewery, 116 F.3d 1052, 1059 (5th Cir.
1997) (holding that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the requested
modification was actually requested and that it is reasonable "in a general sense," which
the court defined as "reasonable in the run of cases").
78. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1994).
79. PGA Tour, 121 S. Ct. at 1893.
80. Id. at 1895.
81. Id. at 1886-87.
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psychological pressure is at a maximum. Their testimony makes it clear
that, in their view, permission to use a cart might well give some players a
competitive advantage over other players who must walk.'
(The Court noted that none of these players expressed an opinion on
whether use of a cart would provide such an advantage for Martin. 83 )
The Court described two ways in which PGA could show that a
modification of its tournament rules would work a "fundamental
alteration" to the tournament: first, the modification "might alter such an
essential aspect of the game of golf that it would be unacceptable even if
it affected all competitors equally."84 The Court acknowledged that "the
waiver of an essential rule of competition for anyone would
fundamentally alter the nature of petitioner's tournaments." 5 An
example of such a modification, the Court explained, might be a three-
inch change in the diameter of the hole.
8 6
Alternatively, the modification might be "a less significant change
that has only a peripheral impact on the game itself" but might "give a
disabled player.., an advantage over others"8 7 and thus "fundamentally
alter the character of the competition."88 Significantly, the Court ruled
that the latter analysis must take into account the particular
circumstances of the individual requesting the modification. Citing
legislative history and its previous interpretations of the ADA,89 the
Court interpreted Title III's "specific prohibition" of "failure to make
reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures"90 to
require "an individualized inquiry... to determine whether a specific
modification for a particular person's disability would be reasonable
under the circumstances as well as necessary for that person, and yet at
the same time not work a fundamental alteration."9'
Thus, in order to assess whether a requested modification would
82. Id. Although Tiger Woods did not participate in the hearing, he is quoted in the
media as agreeing with these witnesses. See e.g. Jenkins, supra n. 6, at DOI ("Even Tiger
Woods, who roomed with Casey Martin at Stanford, has said of the cart issue: 'As a friend,
I'd love to see him get a cart, but from a playing standpoint, is it an advantage? It probably
is.").
83. PGA Tour, 121 S. Ct. at 1887. As a matter of fact, Mr. Nicklaus later said "in
hindsight" that PGA should "grandfather" Martin in to the former rules so he could ride.
Rosaforte, supran. 13.
84. Id. at 1893.
85. Id. at 1896.
86. Id. at 1893. Justice Scalia took the majority to task for the precision of this example.
Id. at 1903 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Perhaps the majority meant simply to point out that
any alteration of size or distance rules or regulations might constitute a fundamental
alteration of the game.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See text accompanying infra nn. 168-71 for a discussion of this precedent.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1994).
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cause a "fundamental alteration" under Title III, one would first look to
whether the modification would alter an "essential aspect" of whatever is
offered by the public accommodation in question. If answered
affimatively, the inquiry stops and the modification need not be
provided. If, however, it is established that the modification does not
alter an "essential aspect," then one must determine whether the
modification would give the person requesting it an advantage over other
participants, taking into account the particular circumstances of the
person requesting the modification. A requested modification need not
be provided if it would place the individual with a disability at a
,competitve advantage over others.
In analyzing the primary question of whether allowing Martin to use
a cart would "alter an essential aspect of the game of golf," the Court first
examined "the fundamental character" of that game. 92 It found that "the
use of carts is not itself inconsistent with the fundamental character of
the game of golf."93 It noted that Rules of Golf ("Rules"), written by the
USGA and the Royal and Ancient Golf Club of Scotland, apply to the
game wherever it is played throughout the world, whether by amateurs
or professionals. 94 The Rules define the game of golf as follows: "The
Game of Golf consists in playing a ball from the teeing ground into the
hole by a stroke or successive strokes in accordance with these rules.'"
95
This definition, the Court observed, does not encompass walking the golf
course.96 The Rules govern professional golfing tournaments, including
those sponsored by PGA.9 7  The Rules do not mandate walking the
course. 98 Their only reference to walking appears in an appendix listing
"'optional' conditions"; that reference suggests language to be used if a
competition chooses to impose a walking rule. 99
The Court further noted that two additional sets of rules governing
PGA tournaments allow use of carts in certain circumstances. PGA's
own Conditions of Competition and Local Rules ("'hard card'"),°° which
applies to professional tournaments,' 0 1 states: "'Players shall walk at all
times during a stipulated round unless permitted to ride by the PGA
Tour Rules Committee.'" 0 2 The PGA Tour and Nike Tour "hard cards"
92. Id. at 1893.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1884.
95. Id. at 1894 (emphasis in original source quoted).
96. Id.
97. PGA Tour, 121 S. Ct. at 1894.
98. Id. at 1884-85.
99. Id. at 1885 n. 3 ("'If it is desired to require players to walk in a competition, the
following condition is suggested: 'Players shall walk at all times during a stipulated
round.'").
100. Id. at 1885.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1885 n. 4.
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require walking in tournaments and the third qualifying round of Q-
School, but carts may be used in the first two qualifying rounds of Q-
School. 0 3 (Indeed, PGA waived the walking rule for all competitors when
Martin made the third qualifying round.0 4) The Senior PGA Tour
tournament, on the other hand, permits use of carts throughout a
tournament. 05 In addition, tournament players may receive a specific
set of rules called Notice to Competitors, which covers conditions of
individual tournaments. 0 6  Such notices have permitted use of carts
under circumstances unique to a particular course, such as
considerable distances between tees. ' °7 Finally, as further support for
its conclusion that walking is not an essential aspect of the game of golf,
the Court cited USGA's handicap system for amateur play, which does
not take into account whether golfers ride or walk or whether they carry
their own clubs.0 8
PGA, however, argued that its tournament games differ from the
game of golf "as it is generally played," even in other golf tournaments.09
PGA Tour and Nike Tour tournaments, it asserted, involve "golf at the
'highest level,'" the goal of which "'is to assess and compare the
performance of different competitors, a task that is meaningful only if
the competitors are subject to identical substantive rules.'""0 According
to PGA, because fatigue caused by walking can be outcome-
determinative, and therefore substantive, modification of that rule by
allowing Martin to ride a cart would fundamentally alter the nature of its
tournaments, "even if he were the only person in the world who has both
the talent to compete in those elite events and a disability sufficiently
serious that he cannot do so without using a cart.""'
The Court doubted the validity of PGA's distinction between play in
its tournaments and that in other competitive golf games. First, it
103. PGA Tour, 121 S. Ct. at 1885, 1885 n. 4.
104. Id. at 1896 n. 49.
105. I. at 1885.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. 1895 n. 44.
109. PGA Tour, 121 S. Ct. at 1895.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1895. PGA's argument brings to mind the "sex-plus" theory arising in the
context of sex discrimination in employment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1994). Under that theory, an employer joins an ostensibly
neutral characteristic with an employee's protected characteristic and claims the neutral
characteristic is the basis of its employment decision, not the protected one. For example,
the Court held in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (per curium),
that an employer discriminated on the basis of sex when it refused to hire women with pre-
school aged children, even though it hired other women who did not have young children.
An employer is not permitted to take the age of children into account when hiring women if
it does not do so when hiring men-a consideration not utilized when hiring men.
Analogously, PGA attempted by way of a "golf-plus" characterization to distinguish ordinary
"tournament golf" from "PGA Tour golf' to remove the latter from Title III scrutiny.
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characterized PGA's asserted need for "identical substantive rules" as a
"guarantee that all competitors will play under exactly the same
conditions or that an individual's ability will be the sole determinant of
the outcome."' 12 Such a guarantee, the Court reasoned, is impossible in
golf because outside factors such as weather may be outcome-
determinative yet cannot be controlled and may thus cause different
conditions among players in a single tournament.1 3 Moreover, the Court
stated, an individual's ability can never be the sole determinant of his
performance because chance often plays a role for better or worse.1 4
The Court's rationale on this point is not particularly persuasive, as
neither PGA nor any other competition sponsor can devise rules to
control factors that cannot be controlled, like weather or chance.
Competition rules are devised to address factors affecting the
competition that can be controlled.
However, even assuming a distinction between PGA Tour golf and
non-PGA Tour golf, the Court credited the district court's finding that
PGA failed to prove that fatigue caused by walking plays any significant
role in elite tournament play."15 It noted testimony of a physiologist, an
"expert on fatigue," indicating that physical fatigue caused by walking a
golf course is insignificant to play, as the walk takes place over the five-
hour duration of a tournament with rest and refreshment breaks.1 6
Rather, the expert testified, fatigue experienced by a tournament golfer is
caused primarily by psychological factors of stress and motivation." 7
Evidence showed that walking in tournaments actually reduces the effect
of such factors. "8
Having found that PGA failed to show that walking is an essential
aspect of its elite tournaments, the Court turned to the question of
whether granting Martin's request to use a cart would "fundamentally
alter the character of the competition" by giving him an advantage over
the other players." 9  It held that PGA violated the ADA when it
summarily denied Martin's request for a modification of the PGA Tour
walking rule and failed to take his unique circumstances into account in
determining whether that requested modification would fundamentally
alter the nature of its tournament.
120
112. PGA Tour, 121 S. Ct. at 1895.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1895-96.
116. Id. at 1896. Martin's expert witness testified that a tournament game consisted of
walking five miles over five hours, with rest and refreshment, and an expenditure of
.approximately 500 calories-nutritionaly... less than a Big Mac.'" Id. (quoting Martin v.
PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp 1242, 1250 (D. Or. 1998)).
117. Id.
118. PGA Tour, 121 S. Ct. at 1896.
119. Id. at 1893.
120. Id. at 1896 (citing Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999)).
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The Court credited the district court's "uncontested" finding that
"Martin 'easily endures greater fatigue even with a cart than his able-
bodied competitors do by walking.'"1 2' That finding was based on the
following evidence: even using a cart, Martin walks more than 25 percent
of an 18-hole round122; the fatigue caused by his disability alone is
"'undeniably greater' than the fatigue his able-bodied competitors endure
from walking the course"'l'; and, while playing, Martin not only endures
fatigue caused by the stress of competition but fatigue caused by "stress
of pain and risk of serious injury" when he walks and gets in and out of
a cart. 2' The Court thus concluded that "[tihe purpose of the walking
rule is... not compromised in the slightest by allowing Martin to use a
cart , 125 so use of a cart would not give him an advantage over the other
competitors. Thus, the Court held, Title III required PGA to waive its
tournament walking rule for Martin and allow him to use a cart.
2 6
Finally, the Court rejected the "administrative burden" argument
validated in Olinger as a means of proving "fundamental alteration."127 It
acknowledged "some administrative burdens on the operators of places
of public accommodations" 128 but viewed such burdens as part and
parcel of the ADA's mandate. 29 First, the Court rejected the notion that
the burden would be onerous, citing evidence of only a "handful of
requests" for modifications of competition rules.13 0 Second, it noted that
"nowhere... does Congress limit the reasonable modification
requirement only to requests that are easy to evaluate."13' Most
importantly, the Court concluded that Title III required public
accommodations not only to give individualized consideration of requests
for modifications, but also to "carefully weigh the purpose, as well as the
letter, of the rule before determining that no accommodation would be
tolerable." 3 2 Indeed such a burden is precisely that required under the
Court's two-pronged analysis of the "fundamental alteration" defense.
33
Again, Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented. Justice Scalia first
attacked the majority's assumption that a court can presume to
determine the "essential aspect of the game of golf or any other game. 134
121. Id at 1897 (quoting Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1252 (D. Or. 1998)).
122. Id. at 1887 n. 17.
123. Id. at 1887.
124. PGA Tour, 121 S. Ct. at 1887.
125. I. at 1897.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1897-98.
128. Id.
129. Id at 1898.
130. PGA Tour, 121 S. CL at 1897-98.
131. Id. at 1897 n. 53.
132. Id. at 1897-98.
133. Id at 1893.
134. Id. at 1902 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Scalia defined "essential" as "necessary to the achievement of a certain
object." 135  He characterized games as having "no object except
amusement," distinguishing them "from productive activity."
1 3 6
Therefore, according to Scalia, because the only purpose of games is
amusement, any rule of any game is "arbitrary" and peculiar to that
game. 137 Under Scalia's interpretation of Title III, the rules of competitive
sporting events could never be subject to scrutiny because all rules are
"essential" to their respective games and therefore cannot be modified
without working a fundamental alteration to the game in question.
38
Furthermore, Scalia argued, because rules of games are arbitrary
anyway, the game PGA offers in its elite tournaments need not entail the
same rules as those used in other golf games. 139 According to Scalia,
Why cannot the PGA TOUR, if it wishes, promote a new game, with
distinctive rules... ? If members of the public do not like the new
rules -if they feel that these rules do not truly test the individual's skill at
'real golf... they can withdraw their patronage. But the rules are the
rules. They are (as in all games) entirely arbitrary, and there is no basis on
which anyone-not even the Supreme Court of the United States-can
pronounce one or another of them to be 'nonessential' if the rulemaker
(here the PGA TOUR) deems it to be essential. 40
Scalia's "game theory" proves too much. By characterizing the
"object" of all games as "amusement" subject to arbitrary rules, he would
immunize all sports14 ' from Title III's reach. As the majority pointed out,
however, Congress could not have meant such a result, as Title III
nowhere exempts "elite athletics" from the requirement that public
accommodations make reasonable modifications. 142
Scalia next took issue with the Court's holding that Title III's
requirement to accommodate individuals with disabilities must be
determined on an individualized basis. 43 While he agreed that "equal
access" to "competitive sporting events" is mandated by Title III, he
distinguished "equal access" from an "equal chance to win competitive
135. Id. at 1903 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
136. PGA Tour, 121 S. Ct. at 1903 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
137. Id.
138. See id. at 1903 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 1902.
140. Id. (emphasis added). By extension, Scalia's view would take sports out of the reach
of Title III's counterpart, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, which
prohibits public accommodations from discriminating on the basis of race, color, national
origin, and religion. Indeed, one author has noted that the argument that a competitive
sports organization can make up its own rules for competitions "was precisely the same
justification that golf used to exclude blacks for so many years." Davis, supra n. 3, at 34.
141. Scalia used the words "games" and "sports" interchangeably. PGA Tour, 121 S. Ct. at
1903 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 1896. The Court further noted that Title III expressly exempts "private clubs or
establishments" and "religious organizations or entities" from its coverage. Id. at 1897 n.
51.
143. Id. at 1903-04 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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sporting events." 144 The latter, he asserted, is not mandated by the
Act. 14
5
But the very nature of competitive sporting events invalidates that
distinction: Presumably a competitive athlete, especially an "elite" athlete
like Martin, enters a competitive sporting event in order to compete, i.e.,
to defeat others, to win. 146 Entering a competitive sporting event means
getting a chance to win. Martin sought a chance to win the PGA Tour,
but without a cart, he could not enter to get that chance. Without a
cart, Martin had no "access" to the tournament, just as, without an
elevator, someone in a wheelchair has no access to the upper floors of a
building.
Scalia's distinction between giving Martin "equal access" to the PGA
Tour and giving him "an equal chance to win" the PGA Tour fails to
account for the dual nature of the ADA's protections, discussed above.
His view of Ttle III's purpose ignores the difference between the ADA and
other federal anti-discrimination statutes. As discussed previously,
"equal treatment," which is required under other statutes, means that
one is treated the same as others; i.e., one's protected status is irrelevant
to his or her ability to participate in covered activities.
The notion of equal treatment seems to be what Scalia meant by
"equal access." But, again, the ADA goes further: so that individuals
with disabilities have the opportunities to enjoy statutorily covered
activities, the ADA imposes an affirmative duty upon a covered entity to
accommodate the individuals' disabilities; i.e., to treat such individuals
differently from those without disabilities. However, this duty is
qualified. On the one hand, the statute requires the individual
requesting the accommodation (i.e., requesting different treatment) to
show that the accommodation is "reasonable" and "necessary." On the
other hand, the statute excuses entities from this duty if they can show
the requested accommodation is not feasible for some reason as defined
by the statute. 147 Such a defense is illustrated by this case, which
144. Id. at 1904 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
145. Id.
146. "To compete" is defined as, "to strive or contend with another or others, as for profit
or a prize." The American Dictionary 301 (2d ed. 1985).
147. The duty to accommodate and its defenses are embodied in Title I of the ADA
governing treatment of disabled employees and applicants in language appropriate to the
employment situation. Whereas Title III speaks of "reasonable" and "necessary"
accommodations that do not "fundamentally alter the nature of" the activity offered by a
public accommodation, Title I requires, inter alia, that a disabled individual be "qualified"
and that an employer "reasonably accommodate" the individual's disability unless the
employer can show that such accommodation "would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of the business" of the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994). A disabled
individual is "qualified" if he or she "can perform the essential functions of the employment
position that such individual holds or desires" "with or without reasonable
accommodation." Id. § 12111(8). In addition to the "undue hardship" defense, employers
have no duty to accommodate if it can show that the individual with a disability "pose[s] a
direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace." Id. § 12113(b).
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required PGA to accommodate Martin's disability unless it could show
that the accommodation would "fundamentally alter the nature of' its
tournament. If PGA had made that showing, it would have had no duty
to accommodate Martin's disability by allowing him to use a cart.
If Martin and PGA are covered by Title III, then the Act requires PGA
to treat Martin differently because of his disability unless treating him
differently would be unnecessary or unreasonable or would alter the
fundamental nature of the PGA Tour. Giving him "equal access" to the
Tour implies only equal treatment. Just as PGA cannot prevent Tiger
Woods from entering-i.e., gaining access-to the Tour on account of
his race,148 it cannot prevent Martin from entering the Tour because of
his disability. Simply by entering the Tour, Woods has an "opportunity
to win" the Tour. But Martin, because of his disability, does not have an
"opportunity to win" the Tour even if he enters it; he and Woods do not
have "equal opportunity." The ADA entitles Martin to this opportunity.
49
Scalia predicted that the Court's interpretation of the ADA as
requiring individualized determinations of the effect of requested
modifications on competitions will provide "a rich source of lucrative
litigation." 50  He "envision[ed] parents of a Little League player with
attention deficit disorder trying to convince a judge that their son's
disability makes it at least 25% more difficult to hit a pitched ball," and
requesting an "order giving the kid four strikes", unless, he added, the




Any decision recognizing a legal right will generate litigation
asserting that right; motions to dismiss exist to eliminate groundless
litigation. Scalia seemed to forget that two years ago the Court, with
himself in a five-member majority, mandated individualized
determinations of disability under the ADA, which will similarly generate
increased litigation-although not from plaintiffs like Martin, but from
Title I further allows employers to utilize "selection criteria" that "screen out or tend to
screen out" individuals with disabilities if the employer can show that the selection criteria
are "job-related for the position in question" and "consistent with business necessity." Id. §
12112(b)(6).
Title II of the ADA, which governs services offered by state and local entities, provides
a very limited "undue financial burden limitation" defense to lessen the requirements of
entities providing "paratransit and other special transportation services." Id. § 12143(c)(4).
Of course, a great body of law has emerged under the ADA as to the meaning of the
above-quoted terms.
148. With apologies to Mr. Woods, there just aren't that many well-known golfers whom I
can use to illustrate the point.
149. "As a society, we are so much better off with people like Casey Martin, who show us
that heart is just as important as talent, who only want an opportunity to compete against
the best in their professions." Michael Waterstone, Let's be Reasonable Here: Why the ADA
Will Not Ruin Professional Sports, 2000 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1489, 1489 (2000) (quoting Jim
Abbott, It's Easy to Accommodate, Golf World 92 (Feb. 20, 1998)).
150. PGA Tour, 121 S. Ct. at 1903-04 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 1904 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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defendants like PGA asserting that a plaintiff is not entitled to the ADA's
protection. The Court has actually made it quite difficult for a plaintiff to
prove disability. That, of course, was not a problem for Martin, but most
impaired athletes are not like Martin, either because their impairments
prevent them from competing at the level required by competitive
sporting events, or because their impairments are not substantial
enough to meet the ADA's threshold.
V. THE DIFFICULTY OF PROVING DISABILTY UNDER THE ADA
A significant hurdle for many persons asserting ADA claims is the
threshold showing that they are "an individual with a disability." The
ADA defines "disability" in a section preceding the individual titles that
applies to all the titles. Individuals may be disabled in three distinct
ways. The definition includes individuals who currently have a
disability, who have had a disability in the past, and who are regarded
by others as having a disability, even though they do not actually have a
disability.1 5 2  The first form of disability is relevant to both Title III
requirements of equal treatment and equal opportunity; the other two
are relevant only to the requirement of equal treatment. 5 3  Title III
requires public accommodations to give those who are currently disabled
equal opportunity to enjoy the benefits they offer.
One who has a current "disability" under the ADA definition has "a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of
the major life activities of that individual. " " The ADA does not define
the terms "physical or mental impairment," "substantially limits," or
"major life activities." These terms are defined in regulations
promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC"), 5 5 which administers Title I; the same regulations were
adopted by the Department of Justice ("DOJ"), the agency that interprets
and enforces Title III. 6  The regulations define physical or mental
impairment as "any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic
disfigurement, or anatomical loss" affecting a body system or "any
mental or psychological disorder."15 7 Major life activities are defined in
152. The definition of"disability" appears at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994):
Disability. - The term "disability" means, with respect to an individual -
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 12102(2)(A).
155. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(2) (2001); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2001).
156. Limas, supran. 15, at 515 n. 60.
157. The definitions are as follows:
2001l
23
Limas: Casey and the Little Leaguers
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2001
TULSA LAW REVIEW
the regulations as "functions such as caring for oneself, performing
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning,
and working. 15 Finally, a physical or mental impairment substantially
limits one in a major life activity if that person is unable to perform a
major life activity or significantly restricted in a major life activity as
compared to an average person.159
The first Supreme Court case to interpret the ADA arose under Title
III and addressed the meaning of "individual with a disability." 60  In
Bragdon v. Abbott, '6 a 5-4 majority of the Court held that someone who
is infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus but is asymptomatic
is nonetheless an "individual with a disability." 6 2 In doing so, it broadly
interpreted statutory definitions and regulations implementing them,
using regulations and administrative guidance developed under both the
ADA and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,163 the ADA's predecessor, as
well as cases that broadly interpreted the Rehabilitation Act. Those
cases included School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,64 in which the
Court had interpreted the term "handicapped individual" under the
Rehabilitation Act to include someone with a contagious disease. 65 In
(i) Any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical
loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological;
musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory (including speech organs);
cardiovascular; reproductive; digestive; genitourinary; hemic and lymphatic; skin,
and endocrine; [or]
(ii) Any mental or psychological disorder such as mental retardation, organic
brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
28 C.F.R. §§ 36.104(i)(i)-(ii) (2001); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(h)(1)-(2) (2001).
158. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(2) (2001); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2001).
159. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(0)(1)-(2) (2001). A person is "substantially limited in a major life
activity" if he or she is
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general
population can perform; or
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an
individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the
condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general
population can perform that same major life activity.
Id. § 1630.2(0)(1). The regulations also state factors to be taken into account in
determining whether someone is substantially limited in a major life activity:
(i) The nature and severity of the impairment;
(ii) The duration or expected duration of the impairment; and
(iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term
impact of or resulting from the impairment.
Id. § 1630.20)(2).
160. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 641. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
163. 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1994). The Rehabilitation Act applies to the federal
government and entities receiving federal funds. Id. § 794.
164. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
165. Id at 289.
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Arline, the Court had relied heavily on regulations implementing the
Rehabilitation Act and legislative history indicating that the definition of
"handicapped individual" should be broadly applied. 166 In Bragdon, the
Court relied on the ADA's express statement that no interpretation of its
provisions should "apply a lesser standard" than those applied under the
Rehabilitation Act or its implementing regulations.' 67
Yet a year later the Court ignored its Rehabilitation Act and ADA
precedent, rejected administrative guidance, and interpreted "individual
with a disability" narrowly to require that someone's disability status be
determined taking mitigating or corrective measures into account.
16 8
That means that even though someone has a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity of that person, if
the person takes medicine or uses some other corrective measure to
control the effects of the impairment, he or she would not likely be
protected from discrimination because of that impairment. The Court
considered three cases under Title I in which plaintiffs had been denied
employment because of their impairments of myopia,169 hypertension, 70
and monocular vision.17 ' Sutton v. United Airlines,17 2 involved sisters
who were certified by the Federal Aviation Administration as commercial
pilots but were rejected for employment as pilots by United Airlines
under its rule that pilots have uncorrected vision no worse than
20/100.1'73 In Murphy v. United Parcel Service, 17 4 and Albertson's v.
Kirkingburg,175 plaintiffs were denied mechanic and driver positions,
respectively, because their uncorrected impairments did not qualify them
for Department of Transportation (DOT) certification. Kirkingburg had
been driving for a number of years, had an excellent record, and had
obtained a waiver from the DOT of its vision requirements.
76
In these cases, the Court did not bar the ADA lawsuits because the
plaintiffs were unqualified 7 7 for the positions; rather, it held that each of
166. Id. at 280 n. 5.
167. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 631, 632 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12201 (1994)). For a discussion of
the reasoning of Bragdon and Arline, see Limas, supra n. 15, at 522-25, 535-37.
168. Limas, supra n. 15, at 525-539.
169. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc, 527 U.S. 471, 476 (1999).
170. Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516, 519 (1999).
171. Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 559 (1999).
172. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
173. Id. at 476.
174. Murphy, 527 U.S. at 520.
175. Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 560.
176. Id. at 558, 560.
177. In order to be protected from discrimination in the workplace under Title I, one must
be "a qualified individual with a disability." That term is defined as "one who, with or
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment
position that such individual holds or desires." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994). Title I's




Limas: Casey and the Little Leaguers
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2001
TULSA LAW REVIEW
the plaintiffs was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA, which
blocked any further inquiry on their claims. Indeed, they may have
been found not to be qualified. But the Court went out of its way to
deprive access to the ADA altogether for these individuals with
impairments that would have been substantially limiting in their life
activities had the individuals not taken corrective measures. 1
7 9
The issue of determining whether an individual is disabled will
likely have a greater impact on Title I cases than on Title II or III cases,
as many accommodations under the latter titles are in the nature of
modifications to public facilities that are not used exclusively by
individuals with disabilities (e.g., buses with wheelchair lifts, ramps,
elevators with braille numerals, crosswalk signs with audible signals).
Individuals who require such modifications would undoubtedly pass the
threshold test of disability. Requests for workplace accommodations
under Title I, however, are usually made on an individual basis, and
therefore the disability status of each person requesting an
accommodation will be individually determined. However, with regard to
the relatively few Title III cases in which a particular individual requests
an accommodation, the threshold issue of disability will come into play.
VI. THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF THE DECISION
PGA Tour's reach is quite short. As just discussed, it adds nothing
to the analysis of whether a would-be athlete who claims to be an
individual with a disability is actually disabled under the ADA and
therefore entitled to request a modification of competition rules.
The Court's analysis of Title III's "fundamental alteration" defense is
very limited. It focuses exclusively on application to competitive sports,
which provide a framework of rules within which athletes test physical
performance. The Court's two-pronged test for analyzing whether a
modification of a competition rule would work a "fundamental
alteration" is of course highly factual, but not any more so than other
factual determinations required by the ADA, such as Title I's "undue
hardship" defense to a request for a workplace accommodation.'8 0 One
author has already proposed some questions to aid this inquiry:
(1) Does the rule involve a skill that an athlete in the particular sport
trains to do? (2) Is this particular skill unique to an athlete in the sport,
or is it a task that the general population can perform? (3) What is the
link between success in the skill the rule tests for and success in the
178. Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 564; Sutton, 527 U.S. at 494.
179. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475 (both petitioners' uncorrected vision was 20/200 or
worse); Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 559 (Kirkenburg's vision was 20/200 in his left eye).
180. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994) (setting out the defense); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)
(1994) (defining "undue hardship" and setting out the many factors to be considered in
determining whether undue hardship exists).
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sport? (4) Would the rule modification place other athleteszat a competitive
disadvantage? (5) Why does the league have this rule? (6) Would the rule
modification change the way the game is played for all participants?18
All questions except (4) go directly to the "essence of the
competition" prong of the Court's test, which the author characterizes as
whether "the rule change would change the game into something it is
not."18 2 The Court's analysis of "the essence of the game" implicitly
considered many of those questions. The Court directly asked question
(4) in the second prong of the "fundamental alteration" analysis, which
determines whether modification of a "non-essential" rule would put
others in the competition at a disadvantage.
The Court's analysis of "fundamental alteration" in the Title III
context will not be particularly helpful in the employment context.
Unlike Martin's situation, there will be cases in which the athlete is an
employee of the sponsor of an athletic competition and is requesting
accommodation to be able to play. The plaintiffs burden of showing that
a requested accommodation is "reasonable" has been stated similarly
under both titles. Like the Title III plaintiff, the Title I plaintiff must show
that the requested accommodation is "reasonable."'8 As courts have
interpreted both statutes, this burden is merely a facial showing. For
example, the Tenth Circuit has described the Title I plaintiffs burden of
proving reasonableness as "a facial showing that accommodation is
possible," which shifts the burden to the employer to "show it is unable
to provide accommodation."184  Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has
characterized the "reasonable accommodation" element of the plaintiffs
case as "'a method of accommodation that is reasonable in the run of
cases.'"' 5 The Fifth Circuit later applied that standard to the Title III's
burden of showing reasonableness of a requested accommodation. 1
86
Courts interpreting Title I have not explicitly addressed whether a
plaintiff must show that the requested accommodation is "necessary,"
8 7
as required under Title III, as Title I does not contain that language.
Presumably that showing would be subsumed under the plaintiffs prima
181. Waterstone, supran. 149, at 1534.
182. Id.
183. See Boykin v.ATC/VanComofColo., L.P., 247 F.3d 1061, 1064 (10th Cir. 2001).
184. Id.
185. Riel v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 99 F.3d 678, 683 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Barth v. Gelb,
2 F.3d 1180, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cerL denied, 511 U.S. 1030 (1994)) (emphasis in
original).
186. Johnson v. Gambrinus Co.ISpoetzel Brewery, 116 F.3d 1052, 1059 (5th Cir. 1997).
187. Neither Title I's definition of"qualified individual with a disability" nor its definition of
"reasonable accommodation" use the word "necessary," but a common-sense interpretation
of the former term indicates that if an accommodation must be made that it is necessary.
Title I defines "qualified individual with a disability" as "an individual with a disability, who
with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
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facie showing that the requested accommodation is reasonable.
The closest analogy in Title I to Title III's "fundamental alteration"
defense appears in the plaintiffs showing that he or she is a qualified
individual with a disability. As part of that showing, the plaintiff must
show that he or she can perform the essential functions of the job in
question. 188 Title I specifically states that the employer's judgment of the
essential functions of a particular job shall be considered evidence of
those functions, provided the employer prepares a written job description
prior to advertising or interviewing for the job.18 9 PGA Tour's analysis of
"fundamental alteration," as discussed above, does not give as much
deference to the public accommodation's judgment of whether a rule is
essential to a competition. 190
Defenses under the two titles are also analyzed somewhat
differently. As mentioned previously, "undue hardship" is an affirmative
defense to a claim for accommodation under Title 1.191 The statute
defines "undue hardship" as "an action requiring significant difficulty or
expense"192 and lists specific factors to be considered including, inter
alia, cost to the employer, "effect on expenses and resources," and
"impact on ability of other employees to perform their duties and the
impact on the facility's ability to conduct business."193 Administrative
burden on the employer in implementing a requested accommodation
has been considered under these factors.194  However, as discussed
previously, the Court in PGA Tour did not interpret Title III's
"fundamental alteration" defense to encompass administrative burden on
the public accommodation in implementing a requested
accommodation. 195
Finally, Title I specifically considers whether the individual
requesting an accommodation poses a "direct threat" to others. That
term is defined in the statute as "a significant risk to the health or safety
of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation." 196 It
appears in the statute as a defense by providing that an employer can
impose "qualification standards" requiring that "an individual shall not
pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the
workplace. " 197 Danger to health or safety has been considered under
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See discussion supra Part VI.
191. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994). See supran. 147.
192. Id. at § 12111(10).
193. Id. at § 12111(10)(B).
194. See e.g. Bryant v. Better Bus. Bureau of Greater Md., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 720, 737 (D.
Md. 1996) (citing the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Interpretive Guidance,
29 C.F.R. § 1630(p)).
195. PGA Tour, 121 S. Ct. at 1897-98. See discussion supra Part VI.
196. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) (1994).
197. Id. at § 12113(b).
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Title III, though in the context of whether a requested modification is
"reasonable." In the context of scholastic athletics, courts have deferred
to school officials' proof that an impaired athlete would be placed at
severe risk of personal harm by competing. 198 Courts interpreting the
Title I "direct threat" defense are divided on whether that defense
includes a consideration of the health and safety of the individual
requesting the accommodation, 199 and the Supreme Court has taken
certiorari on that issue for the 2001-2002 term.
20 0
The most significant legal effect of PGA Tour is its exposure of
organizations like the PGA to coverage by Title III. The Court has made
clear that if a sponsor of a competitive event opens the competition to
the general public it is a public accommodation governed by Title III.
The Court has extended Title III's definition of "public accommodation"
beyond the notion of "places" having a physical location. Membership
organizations such as Little League,20 1 scouting, or other private
sponsors of youth or adult activities will be covered, as long as they
extend membership to the general public.20 2 Title III would apply to
203
marathon and parade sponsors as well.
VII. THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL EFFECTS OF THE DECISION
PGA Tour tells us that competitive sports are not immune from the
requirements of the ADA. The very limited number of athletes with
disabilities who possess a sufficient level of skill to be competitive with
their able-bodied peers receive from the ADA only an equal opportunity to
compete. Obviously, disability affects skill, as athletic skill is determined
by physical and mental prowess. But if the athlete's disability is
irrelevant to the nature of the competition or can be accommodated
198. See e.g. Knapp v. Northwestern U., 101 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996), cert denied, 520
U.S. 1274 (1997); Pahulu v. U. of Kan., 101 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Kan. 1995).
199. Compare e.g. Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985) with Koshinski v.
Decatur Foundry, Inc., 177 F.3d 599 (9th Cir. 1999).
200. Echazabal v. Cheron USA, Inc., 226 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 2001
U.S. LEXIS 9960 (Oct. 29, 2001).
201. Courts have treated this organization as a public accommodation. See Rothstein,
supra n. 13, at 412 (citing Anderson v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 342 (D.
Ariz. 1992) and cases discussed in the media). These cases focused on safety issues.
202. In a 5-4 decision last term, the Court held, in Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S.
640, 659 (2000), that New Jersey's public accommodations law prohibiting discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation, as applied to the Boy Scouts' selection of its members,
violated that organization's First Amendment freedom of association right. Although the
Court assumed that Boy Scouts was a public accommodation, it commented that New
Jersey's definition of that term "is extremely broad." Id. at 658. It further cited four state
supreme court cases and a Seventh Circuit case that all held the Boy Scouts not to be a
public accommodation, noting that no jurisdiction other than New Jersey had held
otherwise. Id. at 658 n. 3.
Even so, the Boy Scouts and similar organizations should be considered public
accommodations under Title III under the Court's analysis in PGA Tour, as those
organizations admit members from the public at large.
203. See Rothstein, supra n. 13, at 411.
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without fundamentally altering the competition, the athlete with a
disability is entitled, like anyone else, to test his or her competitive
ability.
PGA Tour sends a strong positive message, not just to individuals
with disabilities but to the public at large. It reinforces the ADA's goal of
mainstreaming individuals with disabilities into activities of the public at
large with as few restrictions as possible.2 4  Such exposure to
individuals with disabilities builds understanding of issues faced by
those individuals and diffuses negative perceptions of the ADA. 20 5 A
disability expert recently stated: "If the ADA is to continue to receive
favor and not risk congressional repeal or diminution, public support of
the ADA will be important."2 6 Moreover, PGA Tour furthers Congress'
broad goal of changing American society.
Because PGA Tour involved sports, its message will be heard, for
"Americans understand the desire to participate in sports and to attend
sports and entertainment events."20 7 The media will be the primary
source of information and education about that message. The legal
community, in turn, must be the primary source of information and
education for the media and others who influence public opinion.
204. See id. at 404.
205. Seeid.at401.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 434.
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